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court chose to ignore what everyone else considered obvious. It caricatured the
rule of the prudent man and found, surprise of surprises, that Mr. Darrow was
a "prudent man." 9
Unfortunately the Supreme Court 0 refused to swallow this argument. The
majority pointed out that talking in terms of the negligence test, the "prudent
man" rule was irrelevant; Mr. Darrow had explicitly authorized his employee's
conduct. Justice Black prqposed a compromise: Darrow was wrong, but let's
give the rule prospective application only." But the rest of the Court voted him
down. Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said, in effect, that
a trustee may not authorize his employees to act in a manner forbidden to him.
Undoubtedly, the court was right. But nobody seemed very happy about itleast of all, Mr. Darrow.

FORCING PREFERRED DIVIDENDS: THE CHICAGO
GREAT WESTERN SETTLEMENT
The declaration of corporate dividends is usually considered a matter within
the sound discretion of the corporate directors. Courts have traditionally been
reluctant to interfere with this discretion unless it is shown that the action of
the directors in declaring or refusing to declare a dividend is fraudulent, in bad
faith, oppressive, or clearly and extremely unreasonable.' Thus stockholders
suing to compel a declaration of dividends must meet a severe burden of proof.
The probability of their success is liminished by two practical considerations.
One is that the principal sources of evidence are the defendant corporation's officers and directors. The other is that the defendants are backed by the corporate pocketbook and prestige.
However, the rarity of recorded stockholder success in dividend cases does
not necessarily indicate that the stockholder suit fails to offer adequate protection to those who are entitled to relief. Corporate transactions that are used to
9 It may be noted that two circumstances around which the rule was formulated have
changed. One is a growing expectation and demand that experts live up to their vaunted expertise and be judged, accordingly, by a higher standard than that of the prudent man. The
other is that fiduciaries are now compensated for their services. See, e.g., Speight v. Gaunt,
22 Ch. D. 727 (1883) (non-compensation of fiduciaries). This payment can be regarded, at
least in part, as remuneration for the added responsibility which the hired expert is expected
to assume.
10
M osser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
11Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), cited by
Justice Back, merely held that no Federal Constitutional provision compelled state courts to
give retroactive effect to their decisions. Refusing to give retroactive application can be
justified when a case is overruled on which people have relied, or where a rule is formed which
differs from established expectations. The Mosser case neither overruled any case nor defeated any established expectations.
I See Minority Shareholder Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends, 64 Harv. L.Rev. 299
(1950); Dividend Rights of Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, 61 Yale L.J. 245 (1952).
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justify a policy of nonpayment of dividends will be scrutinized, not only with
regard to their effect on the corporation as a business entity, but also in terms of
their effect on the various classes of stockholders involved. 2 This comment describes an instance in which noncumulative preferred stockholders were able to
obtain a favorable settlement by demonstrating that certain otherwise justifiable expenditures had an unreasonably detrimental effect on their class of stock.
I. THE CORPORATE PROGRAMS AND DIVDEND POLICY

The corporation involved in this case is the Chicago Great Western Railway
Company.3 The Great Western, an Illinois corporation, emerged from a reorganization 4 in 1941 with the following capital structure as approved by the
court (Table I).
TABLE I
LONG TERM DEBT

First mortgage 4% fixed interest bonds, maturing in
1988 ........................................... $10,130,100
General income 4-21%contingent interest bonds, matur6,113,600
ing in 2038 .....................................
Reconstruction Finance Corporation note, bearing 4o
6,396,870
interest, maturing in 1951 ........................
Wisconsin Central Railway 31% bonds, maturing
500,000
January 1, 1950 ................................
16,000
Other bonds ......................................
2,735,904
Equipment obligations (various) ....................
TOTAL ........................................ $25,892,474
CAPITAL STOCK

366,104 shares of $50 par value 5% preferred stock ....
352,639 shares of $50 par value common stock ........
TOTAL .......................................

$18,305,200
17,631,950
$ 35,937,150

Dividends on the preferred stock were to be cumulative but only to 15% of
par value, or $7.50 per share. Preferred stock dividends were first declared in
September of 1942, and were thereafter paid regularly up to and including
2 See Minority Shareholder Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends, 64 Harv. L. Rev
299, 303-304 (1950); Dividend Rights of Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, 61 Yale L.J. 245
(1952); Kehl, Corporate Dividends 167-69 (1941).
3
The Great Western is classified by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a Class I
railroad. For history and physical description, see Moody's Manual of Investments 661-72
(1951).
4 The Chicago Great Western Railroad Company (predecessor company) was incorporated

under Illinois Law in 1909 as successor by reorganization to the old Chicago Great Western
Railway. A low level of earnings during the depression and the failure of earnings to improve
after 1932 forced the road into bankruptcy in 1935. See In re Chicago Gt. West. R. Co., 29 F.
Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill., 1939), 32 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ili., 1940); Chicago Gt. West. R. Co.
Reorganization, 228 I.C.C. 585 (1938), 233 I.C.C. 63 (1939), 242 I.C.C. 698, 747 (1940), 247
I.C.C. 217 (1941).
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March 1946. After that date no dividends were declared until December 1, 1949.
On March 31, 1948, the maximum accumulation of $7.50 per share was reached
on the preferred stock. At this date, the preferred stock became in effect noncumulative. 6
One month after the maximum accumulation had been reached on the preferred stock, the Railway filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a
plan by which preferred shareholders would be given the option of exchanging
one share of preferred stock for a $20 par value 4 % unsecured income debenture, maturing in 2049, and one-fifth of a share of common stock. The interest
on the debentures was to be payable out of income which remained after deductions for fixed charges, interest on general income bonds, capital requirement,
and sinking funds for the first mortgage and general income bonds. The debenture interest was to be cumulative to the extent of 13 %.
The stated purpose of the plan was to give to those preferred shareholders
who desired it an opportunity to receive some immediate income on their investment. The Railway claimed that a declaration of preferred dividends seemed unlikely for an indeterminate period because the corporate management had embarked on three extensive programs: (1) increased expenditures for maintenance
of way and structures; (2) dieselization of the road's motive power; and (3) retirement of a substantial part of the Railway's long term debt in advance of
maturity.
In March, 1949, Harris, a preferred stockholder, filed suit in a Chicago Federal court against the Railway, and three months later Zimmerman and other
preferred stockholders also filed suit in the same court. After various motions to
7
dismiss, 6 the two suits were consolidated before Judge Barnes.

No dividends were ever declared on the common stock.
held an amount of stock on which exactly $3,000 of unpaid dividends had accumulated. A sum that exceeds $3,000 is required for federal jurisdiction. 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1951). Harris had not charged a conspiracy among the corporate directors
as had Zimmerman, nor had he asked specifically for declaration of the dividends passed and
unaccumulated. Harris was prepared to argue, in the face of a holding to the contrary in
Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del., 1949), that his suit was a true
class action to enforce a joint or common right, and that therefore the claims of the class could
be aggregated to obtain the necessary jurisdictional amount. The Denver Tramway case
reached its result by finding that (1) the plaintiff's interest was separate in that he could have
brought suit alone if he had had the necessary amount, and (2) although the plaintiff was suing
to compel directors to declare a common fund, it was a fund in which each stockholder would
have a separate and distinct interest. The Denver Tramway case seems to place an unnecessary
obstacle in the already rocky path of the plaintiff stockholder. A dividend can be declared only
for the whole class of stockholders. The individual stockholder sues to enforce a declaration
of dividends in favor of the whole class. The character of the right sought to be enforced
for the class may thus be considered, with perhaps even more logic than in the Denver Tramway case, to be "joint, or common" under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore to allow an aggregation of the claims of the class. Williams v. Green Bay &West.
R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y., 1946) involved debentures closely analogous to stock in
that they carried as "interest" a contingent portion of annual net income to be ascertained
and declared in the sound discretion of directors, and they had no fixed date of maturity.
Following the dismissal of an action by a debenture holder to enforce the declaration of in5

6 Harris
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The substance of the Zimmerman complaint was as follows: By the end of
1946, a particular group of common stockholders had purchased a controlling
interest in the Railway. This group wanted to enhance the value of the common
stock by eliminating or reducing the amount of preferred stock outstanding.
They were informed that direct open market purchase by the Railway of its own
preferred stock was prohibited by an Illinois statute. 8 The group thereupon devised the above-described plan of exchanging debentures and common stock for
preferred stock with the intent of subsequently causing the Railway to retire the
debentures by open market purchases. Since there would be no incentive for
preferred shareholders to make the exchange as long as regular dividends were
being declared, the group caused the Railway to embark on costly and unnecessary programs of maintenance, dieselization and debt retirement. The programs
were intended to serve as an excuse for the withholding of preferred dividends
for an indefinite period. Moreover, once the full accumulation on the preferred
stock had been reached, further undistributed earnings could be retained for the
exclusive benefit of the common stockholders.
The complaint sought to compel the resumption of regular annual dividends
on the preferred stock; to compel the payment of both the accumulated arrearages of $7.50 per share and the dividends undeclared after March 31,1948; 9
and to compel withdrawal of the exchange plan.
The preferred stockholders were prepared to show that the Railway had sufficient accumulated earnings to pay dividends during most of the period between
March 1946, and December 1949. The regular annual dividend on the preferred
0
stock would have been $2.50 per share, or $915,260. The Railway's net income
and surplus" record for the 1945-50 period was as shown in Table II.
The Railway's contention was that the maintenance, dieselization and debt
retirement programs which had prevented the declaration of preferred dividends
were sound and reasonable corporate transactions.
The program of increased expenditures for maintenance was attributed to the
failure during the war years to rehabilitate depreciated track, roadbeds and
terest on the debentures, a second holder brought action for the same relief. The court held:
"The whole body of Class B Debenture holders being entitled to dividends only in common,
the attempt to enforce the declaration of such dividends by some on behalf of all was a true
class suit and the dismissal therefore was conclusive on all." Ibid., at 512. In the instant case,
the Railway initially moved to dismiss the Harris complaint on the authority of the Denver
Tramway case. It then withdrew its motion and Zimmerman moved to dismiss. Once the suits
were consolidated, the question did not arise again.
7Harris v. Davidson, Consolidated Civil Action No. 49 C 462 (N.D. Ill.).
8"[It shall not be lawful for such corporation [i.e., railroad] to use any of the funds thereof
own stock.. . . Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 114, § 14.
in the purchase of its
9These dividends, which were not accumulated, eventually amounted to $4.065 per share.
10From 1942 to 1944 the Railway's net income was well above two million dollars per year.
1 Earned surplus appropriated rose steadily from $4,400,000 in 1945 to $7,400,000 in 1949.
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other structures.1 During the 1945-49 period expenditures for maintenance
(both normal and deferred) increased sharply (Table MI).
The dieselization program was begun in 1947 and until 1949 was financed
under conditional sales contracts calling for initial payments of roughly 25%
and annual payments over a period of seven to ten years, The program was substantially completed in 1949 when additional diesels were purchased under
equipment trusts at 2.75% interest. The trusts called for down payments of 15%
on a cost of $5,900,000 and x of 1% on a cost of $2,110,000, with annual payTABLE II

Date

Net Income

Earned Surplus Unappropriated, as
of Dec. 31

1945 ..............
1946 ...............
1947 ..............
1948 ..............
1949 ..............
1950 ..............

$1,645,930
824,343
1,581,730
2,882,080
1,879,160
2,885,532

$ 4,181,473
4,155,778
5,479,590
8,332,976
9,298,175
10,216,574

TABLE II
Date

Maintenance
Expense*

1945 ..........
1946 ..........
1947 ..........
1948 ..........
1949 ..........

$4,224,955
4,220,909
4,433,437
5,396,362
7,064,561

Capital
Investment
$

593,931
416,806
408,623
803,976
1,318,838

Total
$4,818,886
4,637,715
4,842,060
6,200,338
8,383,399

* Including depreciation and amortization of defense projects.

ments extended over a period of 13f'-15 years. In addition, the $6,000,000 unpaid balance of the conditional sales contracts was refinanced under the equip1 The Railway considered its 780 miles of track between Chicago, St. Paul and Kansas
City as main line, with an average life of 25 years. This would require a renewal of about 31
track miles each year. In the eight years since 1941 the average main line renewals amounted
to only 22.5 track miles, or an annual average deficiency of 8.5 track miles. For the eight-year
period, the "deferred" maintenance in rail amounted to 68 miles on the main line. In addition,
it was felt that bridges, other track and structures were in need of repair.
In January 1948, a "five year plan" for rehabilitation of the road was worked out. This
plan was revised upward in January 1949, when the Railway estimated the total cost of
making up the deferred maintenance, on the basis of the January 1949, price level, at approximately $15,000,000. It was planned to make up the deferred maintenance at the rate of
$3,000,000 per year for five years over and above normal maintenance. The $15,000,000
figure included expenditures for both maintenance expense and capital investment. See ICC
Examiner Howard's proposed report on the application of the Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co.,
F.D. 16068, sheets 5, 6 (Aug. 24, 1949).
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ment trusts. The trusts required annualpayments of $930,000 as compared with
annual conditional sale payments of $2,250,000 in 1948 and $1,900,000 in 1949.
The program of debt retirement is summarized in Table IV.
TABLE IV*
[In Thousands]
FIRST MORTGAGE

BOOMS

GE.NERaA INCOME

BoNms

_______________________________
DATE

1941 (Feb.-Dec.)
1942 ...........
1943 ...........
1944...........
1945 ...........
1946...........
1947 ...........
1948 ...........
1949 ...........

RFC
NOTE
[No
Ds-

Par Value

Cash Dis-

Par Value

Cash Dis-

of Debt
Retired

bursements

of Debt
Retired

bursementst

couNe] t

533
181
323

356
119
239

85
30
40
15
34
16
.....
40 .
30
32
15
765
376
2,374
1,590
21

55
45
45
45
207
45
955
5,000
........

.4
91
219
820
462

.3
89
197
679
393

.2

.2

__________

Par Value

Cash Dis-

of Debt
Retired

bursements

673
266
402
45.4
338
296
2,540
7,836
2.2

441
179
300
45.3
326
257
2,010
6,983
1.2

* Table corrected to nearest thousand except that sums less than $1,000 have been corrected to nearest $100.
f Including sinking fund requirements."

The effect of these large expenditures for maintenance, diesels and debt retirement 14 on the cash position of the road is shoin in Table V.
The corporate management felt that an adequate cash position at this time
was somewhere between four and six million dollars. Thus payment of dividends
during the last quarter of 1948 and the first three quarters of 1949 would have
required the corporation to obtain a cash loan if cash resources were not to be
further depleted.
IH. TaE LEGAL IssuE

The reasonableness of the Railway's expenditure programs must be analyzed
in terms of their effect both on the corporation as a business entity and on the
class of preferred shareholders as compared to other classes of security holders.
In cases where the ability of the corporation to retain its customers and its
credit position is involved, the results of the two analyses may be identical. But
where a corporation embarks on financial policies that have no immediate relation to the operating soundness of the business and that deprive noncumulative
I The sinking fund requirements were $45,000 per year for the RFC note; $50,650 for the
first mortgage bonds; and $15,000 for the general income bonds.
14 The reduction in long term debt since reorganization was as follows:
First Mortgage bonds ..........

General Income Bonds .........
RFC Note .......................

$ 2,630,600
3,372,020
6,396,870

Total ....................... $12,399,490

This reduction, however, was offset by the increase in equipment obligations from $2,735,904
in February of 1941 to $12,955,855 as of December 31, 1949.
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stockholders of dividends, these policies may be held oppressive and unreasonable despite the fact that they result in a saving for the corporation.
The Railway had a very strong contention as far as the programs of maintenance15 and dieselization 6 were concerned. Both were arguably necessary to enTABLE V

Date

Cash

Caia
Capital

aneane
Maintenace

Funds

Cs
Investments

Cash
Temporary

Total Cash

1947
Mar. 31 ......
June 30 ......
Sept.30 ......
Dec. 31 ......

$7,043,983
6,794,552
7,197,434
7,579,587

$1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
754,125

$128,119
128,119
128,119
52,214

$650,000
650,000
............
300,000

$9,322,102
9,072,671
8,825,553
8,685,926

1948
Mar.31 ......
June 30 ......
Sept.30 ......
Dec. 31 ......

6,465,805
6,277,857
6,402,306
3,719,030

553,125
..............
..............
..............

52,214
52,214
50,214
50,214

380,000
390,000
290,000
............

7,451,144
6,720,071
6,742,520
3,769,244

Mar.31 ......
June 30 ......
Sept.30 ......
Dec. 31 ......

3,496,517
2,692,764
2,725,634
4,499,130t

..............
50,214 ............
..............
50,214 ............
..............
21,029 ............
......................................

3,546,731
2,742,978
2,746,663
4,499,130

1950
Mar.31 ......
June 30 ......

4,961,644
4,896,494

......................................
......................................

4,961,644
4,896,494

Funds

Resources*

1949

Exclusive of special deposits, sinking funds and other reserve funds.
t On December 2, 1949, the Railway borrowed $1,500,000 at 3 % interest, payable in three annual installments.
$500,000 was applied on December 26, 1949, to retire the $500,000 principal amount of Wisconsin Central bonds
that became due January 1, 1950. The remaining $1,000,000 was added to working capital.

15Itcould hardly be denied that theRailway's track was in need of substantialrehabilitation.
See note 12, supra. Derailments caused by defects or improper maintenance of way and structures during the years 1941-48 ran well above the average for Class I railroads in the Western
District. Much main line rail was too light for service and was not economical to maintain,
requiring extra ties, better balanced tie plates and more section labor. With the introduction
of heavier locomotives in the early 1930's, "ties became badly rail-cut and the rail line and surface bent, resulting in excessive tie renewals, other track maintenance costs, and frequent
derailments." Examiner's Report, op. cit. supra note 12.
26Many of the Railway's steam engines were old, and replacing them with diesels avoided
the necessity for an extensive equipment maintenance program. The plaintiffs argued that
some of the diesels were purchased under conditional sales contracts which reduced the Railway's cash position more than equipment trusts would have done; and that the essential purpose of refinancing the diesels under equipment trusts was to conserve cash. See deposition of
Edward T. Reidy, secretary of the Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., taken in Chicago, Ill., June 30,
1950, p. 128. So, the reasonable way to buy diesels would have been to purchase under equipment trusts from the outset. There was some suggestion that the Railway was planning to
reply that only a big dollar value equipment trust was marketable on Wall Street. However,
in an impounding order of June 21, 1950, Judge Barnes found that the equipment trust method of financing was equally available in the earlier years and that had it been employed, substantial amounts of cash could have been utilized for other corporate purposes.
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able the Railway to retain its competitive position. 17 Nor could the conduct of
the road in retiring the RFC note in advance of maturity be considered "clearly
unreasonable." The Railway was prepared to show that its indebtedness to the
RFC would have had an adverse effect on its credit rating which was especially
undesirable during a period in which it was endeavoring to obtain the most favorable possible terms for its financing of equipment purchases. There was also
a saving of interest expense.
The plaintiffs anticipated these arguments by securing expert testimony to
the effect that the Railway could have carried through its dieselization and
maintenance programs and most of its RFC note retirement and could stillhave
paid dividends simply by curtailing its purchases of first mortgage and general
income bonds. The decisive question thus became the reasonableness of the bond
retirement program.
When the court approved the 1941 Great Western reorganization, it probably
did not foresee the great increase in earnings that railroads, including the Great
Western, were to experience in the next decade. Net income in 1948, for example, was at that time the highest in the history of the road. Yet, because of
the debt retirement program, no dividends were paid in 1948, although undeclared dividends ceased to accumulate in March of that year. If debt retirement
were always to be considered an adequate excuse for refusing to declare dividends, then dividends could be passed almost indefinitely by a controlling group
of common stockholders. This result would work a virtual fraud on investors
who acquired the preferred stock of the Railway in the reasonable expectation of
receiving some return on their investment.18
17The programs resulted in substantial operating economies. The ratio of operating expense to operating revenue fell from 86% in January, 1946, to 74% in July, 1950, compared

to an average drop from 72.5% to 71.6% for Class I railroads in the Western District. The
relation of transportation expense to operating revenue dropped from 46% to 33% over the
same period, while the average for Class I Western District roads fell from 35.5% to only

34.9%.
I8See the comment in Hazeltine v. Belfast & M.L.H. R. Co., 79 Me. 411, 423, 10 Atl. 328,
333 (1887) that funded debt is a normal part of the financial structure of all railroads and that
to permit this debt to be paid off to the exclusion of declaration of dividends would be "an
injustice amounting to cruelty in many cases." In Dohme v. The Pacific Coast Co., 5 N.J
Super. 477, 68 A. 2d 490 (Ch. Div., 1949), discussed in Ashley, The Future of the Law of Noncumulative Preferred Stock in New Jersey: A Raid on the Inarticulate, 5 Rutgers L. Rev. 358
(1951), the corporation purchased during the period 1932-45 at large discounts bonds maturing in 1945. It was held that the use of the corporation's retained profits for this purchase of its
own indebtedness did not deprive noncumulative preferred stockholders of their right to a
dividend credit in those profits under the New Jersey rule. The court stated: "Annual net
earnings or surplus consisting of withheld annual net earnings may in the discretion of the
directors be applied to legitimate corporate purposes such as payment of debts... and other
ordinary business requirements, and to the extent that they are so used the inchoate right of
non-cumulative preferred stockholders in such funds is lost or terminated." Yet, "it was not
within the normal operation of the business of the corporation to engage in the business of
purchasing its own bonds at discounts. It would seem that the utilization of the earnings for
such purpose, while an advantageous use of the corporate funds, is nevertheless not such a
use as would deprive the preferred stockholders of their dividend rights in the funds so used."
Ibid., at 491 and 497.
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The Railway's directors supported the propriety of the bond program by arguing that bond purchases reduced the fixed interest charges of the Railway,
thereby placing it in a more stable long run financial position. 9 The Interstate
Commerce Commission had given support to this position when it noted that reorganizations, through which creditors and stockholders usually suffer a loss on
their investment, are often the result of distributing surplus in prosperous years
instead of reducing long term debt.20 But in terms of the directors' argument, the
Railway would have placed itself in a much sounder financial position by retiring the fixed interest first mortgage bonds rather than the contingent interest
general mortgage bonds. Yet Table IV shows that the heaviest retirement
was of the general income bonds. As one of the attorneys for plaintiffs frequently
brought out in pre-trial depositions, no railroad ever was forced into bankruptcy
by inability to pay contingent interest. Indeed, with respect to the contingency
of the interest, the remoteness of maturity, the fact that sinking fund requirements were not burdensome, and that the interest was tax deductible, the general income bonds were a very desirable form of indebtedness for the Great
Western.
The Railway's second main argument in support of the debt retirement program was that it resulted in immediate concrete savings for the Railway. A study
of Table IV shows that the bonds, particularly the general income bonds, were
acquired at a substantial discount. In addition, the interest on the retired bonds
was being saved. The Railway's comptroller stated in an affidavit that the debt
retirement program as a whole, including both the bonds and the RFC note, produced a saving in principal amount on the debt retired of over $1,400,000 and
a saving in interest of about $1,000,000 for the period 1946 through the first
quarter of 1950. But the comptroller's figures present a deceptive picture.
First, earnings formerly paid out in interest were deductible, whereas retaining these earnings subjected them to the corporate tax. Second, the cash used in
19The Railway could quote the court in its own reorganization: "It is a matter of common
knowledge that one of the reasons why the railroads have so often been in financial difficulties,
particularly during the times of economic stress, is the relatively large proportion of the indebtedness represented by fixed interest obligations." In re Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., 29 F.
Supp. 149, 158 (N.D. Ill., 1939).
20 ICC, 60th Annual Report 20 (Nov. 1946). See the ICC memorandum of Dec. 3, 1942,
to the Illinois Central R. Co., set out in Guttman v. Illinois Central R. Co., 91 F. Supp. 285,
289-90 (E.D.N.Y., 1950), aff'd 189 F. 2d 927 (C.A. 2d, 1951): "[lilt would be a mistake, in the
present tide of apparently revived earning power, to ignore the, fact that [railroads] have a
very heavy burden of debt and that it may be a crippling burden... if earnings should
radically decline. We have noted with approval that many of the managements are avoiding
this mistake and are using the favorable earnings of the present.., to reduce fixed charges
as rapidly as practicable. While stockholders may.. . be disposed to object to such a policy,
it is the stockholders who will suffer most in the event of future insolvency. They will, we
believe, be shortsighted if, by insistence on immediate dividends, they jeopardize the continuance and possible expension [sic] of a program of debt reduction." In the Guttman case the
railroad faced an early maturing funded debt. This fact played a decisive part in causing the
court to declare that the railroad's decision not to declare dividends on its noncumulative preferred stock was reasonable.
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the debt retirement program could have been used to purchase the diesels outright. Instead, the diesels were financed under equipment trusts bearing 2.75%
interest. Thus the interest saved, in these terms, on the bonds should be reduced
by the interest paid under the equipment trusts.21
The method of bond purchases was also subject to the criticism that economy
had been sacrificed to a desire for speedy retirement of a large amount of bonds.
In January of 1948, with general income bonds selling at 57, the Railway invited
tenders. Between that time and the date of acceptance in March of 1948, the
Railway purchased some $800,000 principal amount of general income bonds on
the open market. This played a material role in driving the price of the general
income bonds up to 66.5-67. Tenders up to 70 were accepted, with the average
about 68. $806,000 principal amount of general income bonds were purchased on
the tenders. Thus the Railway was competing against itself by seeking low
tender offers while at the same time bidding the market price higher, with the
result that bondholders naturally raised their tender price.
The Railway's position becomes even more vulnerable when the exchange
plan is considered. Its stated purpose was to provide preferred shareholders with
an immediate return on their investment. Yet there was no reason why the
Railway could not pay directly to the preferred stockholders the cash that it was
prepared to pay debenture holders under the plan. The Railway emphasized
that interest on the debentures would be tax deductible. Assuming a 38% tax
for each $1.00 available for distribution, the debenture holder would receive the
full $1.00 as interest, while the preferred stockholder would get only 62 as a
dividend. But this solicitude for the welfare of the preferred stockholders was
inconsistent with the fact that in the proposed exchange, the preferred stockholders would suffer a loss of both par and market value.u Moreover, plaintiffs
had considerable evidence that the ultimate aim of the plan was to effect a
total or partial elimination of the outstanding preferred stock. Finally, it seems
a bit unusual for the Railway to advance a plan that would create additional
debt in the form of debentures at the very time when it appeared so anxious to
reduce its outstanding bonded indebtedness.
Were the bond retirement program considered apart from the exchange plan,
the plaintiffs might have been unable to show that the purchase of bonds was
"clearly unreasonable" with respect to preferred shareholders. But the exchange
"The Railway argued that depreciation allowed on the diesels made available enough cash
to wash out the actual charge, so that payments on them should not be considered. The idea of
refinancing the diesels was to "get within our depreciation." Deposition of William N. Deramus
II, president of the Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., July 18, 1950, p. 40. But this line of argument
is simply a sophisticated way of saying that the refinancing helped to conserve the cash position
of the company. See note 16 supra. It does not destroy the validity of offsetting new equipment
trust interest charges against alleged savings of interest from bond retirement, for the Railway would be charging depreciation on the diesels no matter what method of financing had
been employed, whether equipment trusts or fiat cash purchase.
22 See notes 25 and 26 infra.
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plan fitted too neatly into plaintiffs' theory of the case to be altogether coincidental.
As already noted, in April of 1948 the Railway filed its exchange plan with the
ICC. Evidence concerning the programs of dieselization, maintenance and debt
retirement was presented to show why dividends were not likely in the near future. In June 1948, the trial examiner, H. C. Howard, issued a proposed report,
recommending disapproval of the plan.23 The execution of the exchange would
leave the road with more long term debt than equity (58%-42%). Since the
debt-stock ratio (42%-58%) established for the road at reorganization was the
result of extensive study, Howard was reluctant to permit such a significant
change until "the most compelling necessity is shown therefor. Such a showing
has not been made by the applicant."2 4 Howard also stated that the preferred
stockholders would suffer a loss of value in the exchange?- and, except for the
tax advantage, nothing would prevent the Railway from paying directly to the
preferred stockholders the cash that would go to debenture holders under the
plan.
Rehearings were held on January 4 and June 8, 1949. The preferred stockholders intervened in the latter hearing. The main new evidence for the Railway
in the January 4 hearing was the further retirement of debt and the achievement
of a debt-stock ratio of 33%-67% as of October 31, 1948. On June 8 the Railway
presented a poll of preferred stockholders which tended to indicate that less than
25% of the outstanding shares would be exchanged, and that the debt-stock
ratio would thus not be as adversely affected as by a 100% exchange.
Howard proposed a second adverse report on August 24, 1949, and the Railway thereupon withdrew its application and abandoned the plan of exchange.
Howard reiterated that preferred stockholders would suffer a loss in the exchange' and that cash available as interest on the proposed debenture was
equally available as dividends on the preferred stock. He considered unimportant the fact that the interest on the debenture would be tax deductible, in view
23ICC Examiner Howard's proposed report on the application of the Chicago Gt. West.

Ry. Co., F.D. 16068 (June 23, 1948).
24
Ibid., sheet 4.
25 At par the exchange would be $50 (par value of one share of preferred stock) plus $7.50
accumulated dividends for $30 ($20 par value debenture plus one-fifth of $50 par value share of
common stock). At market, the exchange would be $16-17 for $12 on the estimate that the
$20 debenture would sell at 50% of par. The next senior issue, the general income bonds, were
then selling at 65.
26The par comparison would still be $50 plus $7.50 to $30. The market price of $13-14
to which the preferred had dropped still exceeded the $12 estimated market value of the debenture and * share of common stock. The Railway's argument was that loss of value was
intended to eliminate profit from the resale of new common stock and debentures at a price
higher than the market value of the exchanged preferred stock as a motive for participating in
the exchange. If there was a prospect of profit from resale of the new securities, a much greater
number of preferred holders would exchange, and the debt-stock ratio of the Railway would
be adversely affected.
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the amount of that deduction by
of the fact that the Railway had just reduced
27
its extensive debt retirement program.
Howard's main point was that, if the Railway felt reluctant to pay dividends
because the best interests of the road and the public would be served by applying available cash to dieselization and maintenance, then it was inconsistent to
permit the creation of a charge on earnings by the substitution of funded debt
28
for stock that would compel the corporation to curtail these programs.
From the standpoint of the preferred shareholders, the Railway's debt retirement program, viewed in light of the exchange plan, looked like an effort to reduce outstanding debt so that the creation of new debt in the form of debentures
would not create a stock-debt ratio unacceptable to the ICC. The combination
of tenders and open market purchase could thus be fitted into plaintiffs' case.
Between January and March of 1948 the Railway was in an unseemly hurry to
cut its bonded indebtedness in time for the first ICC hearing in April of 1948.
The decision to concentrate on purchasing general income bonds rather than
first mortgage bonds could be explained on the basis that the general income
bonds were available at a larger discount. Thus their retirement would reduce
the par value of outstanding indebtedness more than would expenditure of the
same amount of money for retirement of the first mortgage bonds, and the ratio
of debt to stock would therefore appear more favorable to the ICC.
The pattern which the stockholders developed from the series of corporate
transactions herein described may be summarized as follows: The debt retirement program, together with the dieselization and maintenance programs, were
devices to excuse the halting of dividends. The debt retirement program served
the additional function of making the exchange plan palatable to the ICC. The
halting of dividends, in turn, had three purposes. First, after the maximum accumulation on the preferred dividends had been reached, the earnings of the
Railway could be retained for the benefit of the controlling group of common
stockholders. Second, the halting of dividends gave this group a colorable argument for presenting the exchange plan to the ICC. And third, once the plan had
been approved by the ICC, the halting of dividends was to be the coercive factor
that would gradually compel more and more preferred stockholders to accept
the disadvantageous exchange.
Not only is this pattern consistent with the facts, but it offers a convincing
27Howard also noted that the preferred stock had been given a voting majority for their
protection in the reorganization, and that the exchange plan would shift control to the common
stock.
28"No reasonable and prudent management will declare and pay a dividend until provision
has been made for the meeting of all current corporate needs, nor should it create a charge
upon corporate earnings in derogation of such needs." ICC Examiner Howard's proposed
report on the application of the Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., F.D. 16068, sheet 7 (August 24,
1949). This analysis appears to beg the question by assuming at the outset that the programs embarked on by the Railway were in fact in the best interests of the road and the
public.
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explanation of otherwise highly puzzling acts on the part of the Railway, such
as the vigorous pressing of an unreasonable exchange plan and the method, composition and timing of the bond retirement program. In an oral opinion which
concluded the fee hearing, Judge Barnes commented: "I am satisfied that a plan
was formulated to mulct the preferred stockholders of this railroad....
As far
as I can see, there wasn't any defense to [plaintiffs'] lawsuits."2 9
III. Tu. TAcTIcAL IssuEs
Problems of strategy created almost as many difficulties for the preferred
stockholders as did problems of proof. The first question was whether or not to
intervene in the ICC hearings. On one hand, the conclusion of the ICC would
not be determinative of any issue in the stockholders' action, since the question
before the ICC was whether the plan was compatible with the public interest 0
while the lawsuit was framed in terms of the interests of the preferred shareholders. Nevertheless,the stockholders decided to intervene in order to avoid the
contention that they had not exhausted their administrative remedies before
turning to the courts. The plaintiffs further believed that, had the ICC approved
the plan and thus lent its weight to the Railway's position, the difficulty of carrying the dividend suit would become too great.
Howard's second adverse report was filed in August 1949. The Railway's motion to dismiss the Zimmerman complaint was denied in October. On December
1, 1949, the Railway declared a partial dividend on the preferred stock, and the
next day it borrowed $1,500,000. Full quarterly dividends were declared in
March, June and September of 1950. Attorneys for the plaintiffs viewed this
action as an attempt to "take the wind out of their sails." The attorneys further
felt that the pressure of their suit had virtually compelled the Railway to resume
declaration of dividends, and that they were entitled to reimbursement from the
fund made available by their efforts. Therefore, prior to the payment of the last
three dividends, they moved that a portion of each dividend be impounded to
insure the payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and their costs and expenses in
the event that the plaintiffs should ultimately win on the merits. These motions
were granted, the trial judge stating "that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the declaration of (these) dividends.., came about largely because
of the efforts of plaintiffs and their counsel in connection with the prosecution
of these suits and the work incidental thereto."'"
Among these "reasonable grounds" was the Railway's sudden shift from that
taken before the ICC. It was there urged by the Railway and confirmed by the
29 Trans. of Proceedings at 697-98, Harris v. Townsend, Consolidated Civil Action No. 49
C 462 (N.D. Ill., June 21, 1951).
"0See 41 Stat. 494 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 120(a)(2) (1951). ICC Examiner
Howard felt constrained on several occasions to remind counsel for the intervening stockholders of this fact. See, e.g., ICC Hearing Docket No. F.D. 16068, stenographer's minutes,
p. 205 (June 8, 1949).
"1Findings of fact, June 21, 1950, p. 9, by Barnes, J. Similar findings were made in March
and September.
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trial examiner that no dividends would be paid for an indeterminate period in
the future.
In reply, the Railway argued that conditions had changed considerably from
those on which the Trial Examiner had based his estimate. The dieselization
program was virtually completed, and the diesels already purchased under conditional sales contracts had been refinanced under equipment trusts. Thus no
large cash down payments for diesels would be necessary in the future, and annual payments were reduced, all of which helped to conserve the cash position
of the corporation. The Railway could also point to increased earnings in 1950,
and savings in fuel and labor costs-called surprisingly large by the Railwaythat were already resulting from utilization of the diesels. The Railway's cash
and net current asset position had improved on December 31, 1949, as compared to December 31, 1948. And the debt retirement program had ended as far
as the RFC note and the first mortgage and general income bonds were concerned,3 3 thus removing another drain on cash.
The plaintiffs contended that, if the $1,500,000 which the Railway borrowed
on December 2, 1949, be ignored, the Railway was in a weaker cash and net
current assets position on December 31, 1949, than on December 31, 1948. In
addition, 1949 earnings ran below those of 1948. The Railway suggested in reply
that this slump in income was chiefly attributable to the increased maintenance
program. Thus, if maintenance had been held at the 1948 level, the difference of
$1,668,199 less 38% tax, or $1,034,283, would have been added to income.
The Railway appealed from the impounding orders to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. At this point a committee of preferred stockholders was
formed which was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the
impounding orders. The committee claimed it represented the true interests of
the preferred stockholders in opposing the impounding of their dividends and in
backing what the committee considered wise and sound decisions of the Railway
in postponing dividends while the property was being built up. In their Circuit
Court briefs, both the Railway and the committee challenged the true class nature of the litigation and denied that the plaintiffs fairly and adequately represented the class.34 The committee also began to solicit authorizations from preferred stockholders.
32"The applicant's corporate requirements are such that for the next five or six years it is
probable that no dividends upon the preferred can be paid." ICC Examiner Howard's proposed
report on the application of the Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., F.D. 16068, sheet 7 (August 24,
1949).
" While only $2,400 face value of first mortgage and general income bonds were retired in
1949, the Railway retired $500,000 Wisconsin Central bonds and $1,053,424 of equipment
obligations. There was, however, no such substantial debt retirement in advance of maturity
as in 1948. Several directors included among their reasons for declaring a dividend the increased efficiency of the corporate management since William N. Deramus III had assumed
the presidency of the Chicago Great Western in May of 1949. And reduced fears of an impending depression had influenced one director to vote for the dividends.
34 The thrust of defendants' argument was that, if the proceeding were not a true class
action, a holding for the railroad would be no defense against the suits of preferred stock-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

The response of plaintiffs was twofold. First, they charged that the committee owned a large amount of common stock, which rendered its representation
suspect, and that although purporting to be opposed to the merits of the litigation, its purpose was only to oppose the impounding orders and the allowance of
fees to the plaintiffs' attorneys. Second, they entered into competition with the
committee in the solicitation of authorizations. The strategy of the plaintiffs
was explained by one of their attorneys in this way: "[I]f the ... committee,
unopposed by the plaintiffs, should obtain a half or two-thirds of the class to
sign authorizations, I felt that that could have a serious adverse and conceivably
inarticulate psychological effect on this court and on the Court of Appeals,
which we, in duty to the class, could not permit to happen."35 As it turned out,
the plaintiffs lost the battle of authorizations. 36
The Circuit Court reversed the impounding orders, stating in a brief per

curiam opinion:
Plaintiffs make no claim that defendant Railway Company is insolvent or for any reason unable to meet its obligations as they mature.... Whether this is a true class
action has not yet been and can not be determined until after production of evidence
upon the merits. It seems clear to us, therefore, that the orders were unjustified prior
to determination of the merits, and that, before such event occurs, any such order is
wholly premature and unsupported in law. ....37
holders not parties thereto. Defendants also pointed to Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
113 F. 2d 629, 632 (C.A. 7th, 1940): "It is a condition precedent to the existence of the right to
maintain a class action that the court find that the plaintiff's suit will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all." The committee made much of the fact that plaintiffs represented at
most 3% of the preferred stockholders, and that the committee itself had received authorizations from several times that number.
3 Trans. of Proceedings at 60-61, Harris v. Townsend, Consolidated Civil Action No. 49 C
462 (N.D. Ill., June 18, 1951). Compare a letter by the committee, Aug. 25, 1950, requesting
authorizations "because it believes that its participation in the litigation will carry more
weight if the courts are aware of the number of Preferred Stockholders who oppose the actions
of the plaintiffs."
"The difficulty of overcoming the initial presumption in favor of the corporation is thus
seen to be as great in dealing with stockholders as it is with the courts. Furthermore, the corporation is in a powerful position to influence the opinions of its shareholders directly. In a
letter of March 30, 1950, to the preferred stockholders, the president of the Great Western
commented that a part of the March dividend had been impounded and added: "The directors
and the management sincerely desire to place your property in a sound position and pay dividends. Stockholders are entitled to income on the investment in such securities. It is, however,
necessary to build sound value into any enterprise before equity interests can be assured of continuing a dependable income. The Company's entire objective has been and is to so conduct
its affairs that the locomotive and equipment purchases and its track improvement program
could progress more rapidly, with lower interest charges and economy in operation, than could
otherwise be hoped for." It may be remarked that the letter was completely silent about the
debt retirement program.
37 Zimmerman v. Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co., 185 F. 2d 399, 400 (C.A. 7th, 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 934 (1951). The result seems unsatisfactory. If plaintiffs' attorneys were to
prove on the merits that their efforts had caused the declaration of dividends, they would be
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Beginning in September 1950, intermittent efforts were made to settle the
main litigation out of court, and various proposals and counterproposals were
offered. However, no agreement was reached until, on May 1, 1951, as one of
the Zimmerman attorneys arose in court to make the opening statement on behalf of the plaintiffs, an attorney for defendants suggested further settlement
negotiations. An agreement was worked out among the attorneys that night,
and approved by the trial court as fair and reasonable after notice to all preferred shareholders.
By the time of the settlement, the Railway had already resumed regular dividend payments on the preferred stock and had paid $1.12 per share in
liquidation of arrearages, leaving an unliquidated arrearage of $6.37 per share,
or $2,333,913. The agreement provided that the Railway would in all events
continue to pay its regular dividends for the balance of 1951 and that thereafter,
until such time as the arrearages were fully paid, the Railway would
pay regu3' 8
lar dividends to the extent of 60% of the "available net income.
As to the arrearages, the Railway agreed to pay $3.00 per share by July 16,
1951, and, starting in 1952, to devote the 60% of "available net income" less
regular dividend payments exclusively to additional dividends until the remaining arrearages of $3.37 per share were completely eliminated.
The Railway further agreed to pay reasonable costs and attorneys fees, as allowed by the District Court, reserving, however, the right to appeal. All defenses in connection with the class nature of the proceedings or the extent to
which the plaintiffs fairly and adequately represented the class were waived by
the Railway and the intervening stockholders' committee.
While the Railway did not agree to pay the $1,487,297, or $4.06 per share,
undeclared and not accumulated, the plaintiffs regarded the Railway's agreement to pay attorneys fees (and thus to enable the preferred shareholders to
receive the full dividends provided for under the settlement agreement) as a
9
settlement of the claim.3
entitled to compensaton from those very dividends. Yet once the dividends were completely
distributed to several thousand stockholders, it would become virtually impossible to levy on
them for compensation.
38The agreement defined "available net income" as income after fixed charges, less sinking
fund payments and capital fund requirements for the first mortgage and general income bonds,
interest payments on the general income bonds, and any amounts necessary to restore to the
capital fund accounts monies used to pay interest on the first mortgage bonds; and plus the
amount, if any, by which maintenance expense for the year should exceed 19% of the Railway's total operating revenues, and the amount, if any, by which the amortization of defense projects under Necessity Certificates should exceed the normal rates of depreciation
established by the ICC. These last two provisions served as protection for the plaintiff stockholders. It was necessary to place some limit, as far as the declaration of dividends was concerned, on the controllable item of maintenance expense. And rapid amortization of defense
projects would materially reduce income now as against the future. But the provisions were
flexible in that the actual expenditure for maintenance was not limited and the emergency
amortization basis of depreciation could still be utilized for tax purposes.
39In accordance with the settlement agreement, the Railway applied to the ICC for permission to borrow money for working capital in order to carry out the terms of the agreement,

894

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

A comparison of the terms of the settlement agreement with the relief requested in the Zimmerman complaint shows that the objectives of plaintiffs
were substantially attained. Regular dividends had been resumed on the preferred stock; the Railway had agreed to liquidate the accumulated arrearages;
a settlement had been made of dividends undeclared and not accumulated; and
40
the Railway had abandoned its exchange plan.
and on June 6, 1951, the ICC approved an issue of $3,000,000 of promissory notes by the
Railway at an interest rate of 32.
40On June 21, 1951, Judge Barnes allowed $500,000 as "the usual and customary, fair and
reasonable fee for services such as have been rendered by counsel for complainants in these two
cases." Trans. of Proceedings at 700, Harris v. Townsend, Consolidated Civil Action No. 49 C
462 (N.D.Ill.,
1951). The award appears fair in light of the difficulty of stockholder suits. In
addition, the contingency of the fee and the infrequency of success make the suit a highly risky
one for attorneys to undertake. If the fee is not made liberal enough to encourage competent
counsel to undertake such cases, plaintiff stockholders will be helpless and the potential therapeutic effect of vigilant shareholder supervision over the decisions of corporate directors will
be lost. On June 17, 1952 (No. 10481, Advance Sheet), the Seventh Circuit reduced the fee allowance to $350,000. The court found that time spent on the impounding orders and solicitation of preferred stockholders added nothing to the value of the services rendered (but see text
and notes at note 35 supra), and that the settlement agreement only provided "some additional
safe-guards" for dividends "due under any circumstances." (Query whether dividends are in
fact "due" until they have been declared.)
In passing, the court noted "the unwelcome aroma of the tactics of a pressure group" in
what it felt to be the extreme liberality often shown by lawyers in applying for fees. But the
$350,000 fee approved by the court, which amounted to an hourly charge of roughly $50 for
every lawyer associated with the case, irrespective of his standing in his firm, was still substantial. That such a fee was approved despite the court's fear that it might "seem extravagant not
only to the public but to other members of the bar," bears witness to the court's appreciation
of the complexities and risks of stockholder litigation.

